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An Ontology of Economic Objects:
An Application of Carl Menger’s Ideas
By GLORIA L. ZÚÑIGA*
ABSTRACT. Economic reality is constituted by economic objects such as
goods, commodities, money, value, price, and exchange which together
give rise to the complex entity known as the market. Each of these cate-
gories is governed by exact laws that provide the conditions for settling
objectively whether individuals’ views about an instance of any category
indeed correspond to that category. This paper describes these laws as an
ontological application of Carl Menger’s 1871 contribution. This paper
employs Carl Menger’s framework from his 1871 contribution as the basis
for advancing such conditions for each category of economic objects. The
aim of this paper is to lay the groundwork for an ontological description of
economic reality. This paper, then, can be conceived as a project in social
ontology of the sort defended by John Searle.
I
Introduction
ECONOMISTS SPEAK OF MACROECONOMIC PHENOMENA such as inflation, unem-
ployment, and growth as existing conditions in our social reality. These
conditions describe existing states of affairs in the world which affect
choice.  To the average individual, for example, such conditions are facts
which will influence his saving and spending decisions. When making eco-
nomic decisions, then, individuals view the world as composed of eco-
nomic facts. It is not that the individual, qua economic agent, shapes the
world in a particular way. Tables and chairs, mountains and trees, minerals
and rain, dogs and cats—all real things in the world remain the same, and
as clearly apprehensible to him as these real things are when he is not
acting  as  an economic  agent.  However,  there is  a  difference in how the
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individual, qua economic agent, divides the reality he perceives. He orders
things in the world according to their role in the economic conditions
which affect his plans. As a result, a thing of natural beauty such as a tree
may acquire an economic character if he perceives a causal connection
between the tree and his need for shelter. The individual thus perceives the
tree not just as a gift of nature, or a beautiful thing, or as an instance of a
woody perennial plant, but also as an intermediate good, a means for the
fulfillment of a plan to build a house.
Similarly, all things in the world—both artifacts and naturally existing
things—are viewed by the economic agent as constituents of a reality di-
vided by and articulated through economic considerations. All phenomena
which economists speak of constitute a reality viewed through the lenses of
the economic actor. The elements of such phenomena can not be described
by the language of physics alone since such a description would lack the
social dimension of objects, such as the tree qua construction material.
Instead, mainstream economists refer to the ‘economic microfoundations’
of such phenomena which are constituted by elements such as firms,
consumers, and markets. But these elements of macroeconomic
phenomena presuppose other, more elementary, economic objects. For
example, a ‘consumer’ presupposes goods and a market, and ‘firms’ pre-
suppose the production of a good, the demand for a good, and a labor
market, and ‘market’ presupposes an existing notion of exchange. There
are, then, even more fundamental elements in economic phenomena to
which we may refer as economic objects.
The relevant question here is this: what makes any one thing an eco-
nomic object? Based on the discussion above, the quick and easy answer is
that an economic object is a product of beliefs and physical things. How-
ever, this answer requires further examination. The purpose of this paper is
to present an ontology of economic objects as a first attempt to lay the
groundwork for a complete description of the aspect of social reality we
shall call economic reality. Throughout the development of the body of
economic theory, there has been a piecemeal approach to the description of
economic objects such as money, price, and others. With only one ex-
ception, no single economist has contributed a general theory of economics
containing an exact description of all economic objects which are part of
its theoretical framework. This exceptional contribution was provided by
Carl Menger in his PrincipIes of Economics, first published in 1871.  Central
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to Menger’s general theory is a description of laws governing six economic
objects: economic goods, commodity, money, value, price, and exchange.
The ontology of economic objects in this paper will be founded on Men-
ger’s theoretical framework, although I include some extended philosoph-
ical analysis as well as considerations from the perspective of mainstream
economics.1 Menger’s description is significant because it offers the con-
ditions for settling objectively whether the views individuals have about an
instance of a given category of economic objects indeed correspond to that
category.
Let us, then, proceed by considering once again our earlier question:
what makes any one thing an economic object? According to Menger, the
answer is a combination of two things. First, the views we hold about
things qua economic objects. Second, the laws describing the categories to
which such economic objects belong. The first is an epistemic point which
we shall clarify next. The second is part of the larger ontological task of
this paper which we shall resume once we have disposed of the first.
II
An Epistemic Clarification
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS PLAY an important role in social phenomena. In
economic judgments, the views that individuals hold about things qua eco-
nomic objects are central to the analysis. For example, a dollar bill is
treated as money because of people’s beliefs that it is a token of a universal
medium of exchange.2 Such beliefs about dollar bills or any other unit of
accepted currency are sub]ective because there is no single physical prop-
erty that is common to all the members of the class of economic objects we
call money. In other words, money is not reducible to a physical de-
scription of the paper, metal, plastic, or electronic components which com-
prise the various kinds of money we recognize as, and indeed call, money.
Nevertheless, we must also consider that people are frequently mistaken
in their beliefs. The case of counterfeit money presents a fitting example in
which individuals who accept counterfeit money in their transactions are
mistaken in their views about those tokens they take to be genuine
instances of the type-category money. However, an economic object is not
arbitrarily designated to be a token instance of a type-category by our
merely believing it to be so. Although economic judgments are subjective,
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they are not arbitrary. There are, as we shall see, certain conditions or, as
Menger calls them, exact laws for each economic category such that the
truth or falsity of a belief about an economic object can be objectively
settled.
But I am getting ahead of the ontological story about money. The chief
point that I would like to drive home in this epistemic clarification is that
economic objects are not reducible to either beliefs or to some intrinsic
property of things. Economic objects, as social phenomena, are the product
of beliefs and objective properties of things, some of which are physical
facts and others are social facts. A coin, for example, has the objective
property of the metal it is made of. The social fact is that a piece of round,
flat metal with a fixed value which issued by a government is treated as
money. Such social facts arise in spontaneous social activity. The ensuing
ontological description, then, will include both the subjective and objective
factors in economic phenomena. In what follows, I shall describe Menger’s
six categories of economic objects: good, commodity, money, value, price,
and exchange.
III
Menger’s Six Categories of Economic Objects
The Category ‘Economic Good’
AN ECONOMIC GOOD EXISTS as such by virtue of putative features that an
individual attaches to a thing in relation to an end the individual has in
mind. With this end in mind, the thing is either the mediate or immediate
means. In either case, the thing thus acquires what Menger calls a goods-
character. Hence, the goods-character of a thing cannot be instantiated in
the thing apart from a judging mind. The following conditions describe the
subject-dependent mode of existence of an economic good:
1. A judging subject must perceive a thing as scarce, relative to this
total supply of the thing.
2. The thing must be evaluated in relation to a need known to the judg-
ing subject as more urgent than any other need. Because less urgent
needs might have to be sacrificed, an evaluation of means ensues in
order that the subject can make the most efficient allocation of re-
sources to acquire the thing and thus maximize his total utility.
3. The thing  acquires  an  importance  to  the judging subject in relation
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to this unmet need or want, since the judging subject perceives a
causal connection between the thing and the fulfillment of an end. It
is with the association of the thing to the judging subject’s expecta-
tions to the thing that the thing acquires the putative feature of an
economic good.
4. Not least in importance is the judging subject’s belief that he has a
feasible command of the thing sufficient to be able to direct it to the
satisfaction of an end. If the judging subject does not hold this belief
because, for example, his resources are insufficient to acquire the
thing, then the thing does not acquire a goods-character. Neoclassical
economists would characterize this point by saying that the thing
does not enter into the individual’s utility curve.3
The Category ‘Commodity’
AS WE HAVE SEEN ABOVE, a thing is a good if an agent perceives it to be in
direct connection with the fulfillment of a want or need. This is, however,
only one side of the coin for, on the other side, a thing must also be sup-
plied in order for it to be acquired. This other side of the coin is what
describes the commodity-character of a thing: its availability for sale,
exchange, or acquisition, regardless of its “tangibility, mobility, or charac-
ter” as either a consumption or a production good.4 The conditions for the
commodity category of economic objects are as follows:
1. A thing intended for sale at a price agreed upon between buyer and
seller.
2. A dependence relation of the thing for sale to the seller of such a
thing. This dependency relation is what gives rise to the commodity-
character of a thing.
3. The use of a commodity is not intended for consumption but for sale
or exchange. Once a commodity is purchased with the intention of
consumption, the commodity-character of the good ceases although
its goods-character does not.
4. The marketability of a commodity is limited to:
a. Persons who perceive it as an economic good.
b. Persons who are not prevented, legally, physically, or otherwise,
from purchasing it.
c. Persons who have knowledge of its availability for purchase.5
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The Category Money’
IN THE Principles, Menger describes the historical emergence of money. For
our purposes, the conditions described below apply only to the mature
concept of money: that which is considered a universal medium of
exchange as well as a commodity for storing exchangeable wealth. Thus,
the conditions for the money category of economic objects are:
1. The widespread acceptance of a medium of exchange—i.e., a type-
currency—as money.
2. The marketability of a type-currency based on its widespread accep-
tance.
3. The marketability of tokens corresponding to a type-currency based
on the widespread acceptance of the type-currency.
4. Legal orders which legitimize both type-currencies as well as their
corresponding tokens as:
a. Universal substitutes in exchange.
b. Commodities for storing exchangeable wealth.
5. The acceptance of the unit measures of a type-currency—i.e., its de-
nominations—as objective scales for assigning a price to any com-
modity, including the exchange ratio with other type-currencies qua
commodities.
The case of counterfeit money presents an interesting philosophical
problem for it suggests that, if the existence of money is dependent on
people’s beliefs, then error on the part of subjects who mistake counterfeit
money for actual money could not be discovered objectively by means of
facts. Let us, then, address this problem. In the presence of counterfeit
money, economic agents might be fooled by the token objects they believe
to be genuine members of the type-category money described above. The
error might be,in fact, passed inadvertently through several exchanges with
other individuals. But this error will not be a lasting one unless the coun-
terfeit money is stored under a mattress.In normal circumstances, however,
the discovery of error will occur quickly and systematically. It will occur
quickly because,given the velocity of the circulation of money,it is unlikely
that counterfeit money will not reach a bank sooner rather than later. Pri-
vate banks, as sellers of the commodity money, have a vested interest in
establishing security checks for the verification of genuine tokens in their
transactions.   And the discovery of error will occur systematically because
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the facts which will settle the truth or falsity of the beliefs individuals have
about token instances of money are established by the legal orders which
oversee the circulation of its currency.
The problem of error, then, is an epistemic problem of the individual.
Within a larger social framework, money has a structure of social facts
which settle objectively the truth or falsity of the individual’s beliefs about
an instance of the type-category money. It is by virtue of social facts that
the type-category money has a mode of existence which is not altered by
any single individual’s false beliefs. Accordingly, instances of error in a
judgment about a false token of the type-category money do not alter the
false token by arbitrarily instantiating in it the properties of an actual token
any more than the false token alters the type-category itself. In our present
nationalized monetary systems, the legal orders are institutionalized central
banks. They determine the kind of paper, weight, texture, color, and other
secret security measures to prevent duplication. Central banks have a
vested interest in keeping counterfeit money out of circulation because the
national currency is also a commodity. As such, consumer confidence in
the stability and strength of a type-currency will determine its demand in
international money markets. Any rumor of counterfeit money will seri-
ously affect a currency’s exchange value.The systematic checks on the part
of central banks are,therefore,rigorous in strong currency systems. Since
strong currencies are the only ones worth the trouble of producing coun-
terfeit tokens, the occurrence of counterfeit money is rare. Moreover, pri-
vate banking institutions which accept foreign currencies follow the sys-
tematic controls established by the central bank of the currency’s origin
since they, too, stand to lose by accepting counterfeit money. Successful
non-banking businesses, too, will adopt routine checking mechanisms in
their daily transactions for verifying the authenticity of certain denomina-
tions most likely to be counterfeit in order to prevent losses. Hence, coun-
terfeit money will be most likely discovered even before it reaches a bank.
The Category ‘Value’
VALUE IS A THORNY CATEGORY because the term ‘value’ is often used in con-
flicting ways. Most accounts of value, for example, attempt to reduce it
either to the mind or to some intrinsic property of things. Of all theories of
value, however, economic value theory stands out as the most coherent
theory, the episode of the labor theory of value notwithstanding. Ever since
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the publication of Menger’s Principles, economic value has been described
as subjective. Accordingly, the category of economic value has the follow-
ing conditions:
1. A significance attached to a good resulting from a conceptualization
of the good in terms of a desired end. Such a conceptualization can
be characterized as an interested evaluation since the agent perceives
a causal connection between the possession of the good and the
fulfillment of an end.6
2. The recognition of a perceived utility stemming from concrete quan-
tities of a good in relation to an end.
3. The instantiation of the feature of scarcity in a good resulting from
the agent’s perceived lack of concrete quantities of such a good in
relation to the fulfillment of his total utility.
4. A dependence relation between the assigned importance to any one
need or want and the relative importance of other needs or wants.
5. A dependence relation between the relative importance of any need
or want and the agent’soverall degree of fullest satisfaction expected.
6. A dependence relation between the importance of higher-order goods
and the importance of first-order goods.7
7. A dependence relation between the future value of things and the
present value of things.8
8. The nature of the significance attached to a good varies according to
the relation between wants and things. Hence, the putative signifi-
cance of a good in a judging subject’smind is transitory since such
significance arises and disappears as wants arise and disappear.
9. The value of the services of particular goods such as land, capital, and
labor are subject to the same laws of value, outlined above, as for any
other economic good.
The Category ‘Price’
SINCE PRICE IS ATTACHED to a commodity, many modem economists refer to
price as an objective measure of value. This is somewhat misleading, how-
ever, because the objectivity to which they refer is not a feature of price. It
would be inconsistent to assert that price is an objective measure since
such an assertion would raise the following question: Upon what facts is
the objectivity of measurement grounded? Since the value of a good is
acquired from putative features attached to the good by a judging subject,
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there cannot be any objective facts upon which to establish the objectivity
of price or its measurement. It is unclear to what, then, objectivity is as-
cribed. One possibility is that objectivity is predicated of number as an
abstract entity. But this, surely, is not what is meant.9
A better interpretation of what modern economists mean when they refer
to price as an objective measure of value is that the discrete succession of
natural numbers gives rise to an objective criterion of identity for each
number in this succession. Let me briefly elaborate by means of an illus-
tration. Suppose that there are two groups of things in the world. One
group consists of pencils, and the other group consists of chairs. By com-
paring each group based on a one-to-one correspondence between each
single element in the pencil group with one element in the chair group, we
may find that both groups are correlative in number. In other words, in our
example, there is an exact one-to-one correspondence with respect to
quantity between the elements of both groups. We could say, then, that
concrete re~ility grounds our concepts for numerical representation (e.g.,
two, three, etc.)of quantity identity in two distinct groups of things. Insofar
as mathematical beliefs concerning numerical quantities are about repre-
sentations (e.g., names, symbols, or utterances) in the form of one, two,
three, and so on, which can be said to be grounded on states of affairs in
the world that can be described in terms of numerical quantities, then the
theory of number must allow for a realist criterion of identity.10 How could
mankind have developed mathematical formulations involving numbers if
representations of numerical magnitudes were to be conceptualized dif-
ferently by different people? And, more particularly, how could we have
developed any system of prices if any one individual could not grasp the
identity relation between the $5 price of good X and the $5 price of good
Y? That we are able to grasp identity relations in numerical quantities
speaks of the intelligibility of concrete reality. In this sense, then, we can
assert that the criterion of identity of discrete numerical magnitudes is ob-
jective since its truth is settled by facts in the world.
The above explanation is not offered by neoclassical economists, al-
though it does not contradict neoclassical price theory. However, without
the above explanation, the mainstream characterization of price does not
appear to cohere with the theory of subjective value.For Menger, the above
explanation is unnecessary since he does not characterize price in the same
misleading language as that found in neoclassical theory.    In fact Menger
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anticipates this problem when he writes, “since prices are the only phe-
nomena of the process that are directly perceptible, since their magnitude
can be measured exactly, and since daily living brings them unceasingly
before our eyes, it [is] easy to commit the error of regarding the magnitude
of price as the essential feature of an exchange, and as a result of this
mistake, to commit the further error of regarding the quantities of goods in
an exchange as equivalents.”11 Price, then, is merely an objective mag-
nitude of numerical value. But the putative value of the commodity tagged
at a particular price is not equivalent to the price. The putative value is
subjectively evaluated by the agent. Accordingly, the conditions for the
price category of economic objects are as follows:
1. Price is a numerical magnitude that can be measured exactly and
objectively.
2. The value of the discrete units of magnitude tend to increase or de-
crease in an inverse relation to increases or decreases in the supply of
the good, ceteris paribus.
3. The value of the discrete units of magnitude tend to increase or de-
crease in a direct relation to increases or decreases in the demand of
the good, ceteris paribus.
4. In the presence of competition, the price of a good will tend to de-
crease since competition tends to increase the available supply of
goods to meet the demand.
5. A price agreed upon by a buyer reflects one objective measure
among a range of possible magnitudes at which the buyer might have
been willing to exchange.12
The Category ‘Exchange’
ALL OF THE ABOVE CATEGORIES come into definite relations in the category of
economic objects called exchange. Namely, an individual will perceive a
thing as a good if it will satisfy a need or want. This evaluation results in
the good acquiring a significance to the individual which instantiates its
economic value. Since the thing is perceived as a good, then it is available
as a commodity offered in exchange for a price. The seller of the com-
modity also finds value in the exchange since he attaches greater signifi-
cance to the proceeds of the sale that in possessing the commodity. The
asking price for the commodity is an objective magnitude which is ex-
pressed in terms of a quantity of money as the pecuniary term  of the trans-
Ontology of Economic Objects                             309
action. As such, money is the medium for the exchange. The exchange
requires at least two participants (the seller of the commodity, and an agent
who perceives the commodity as a good), a thing (perceived by the po-
tential buyer as a good, and perceived by the seller as a commodity) with
an assigned price, and a monetary transaction. If an exchange between two
or more parties occurs, then the transaction is considered mutually bene-
ficial and the results more satisfactory than if the exchange had not oc-
curred. The conditions for the category exchange are as follows:
1. If two or more individuals contemplate a mutual transfer of com-
modities such that they assess their needs to be better satisfied with
the transfer than it would be the case in the absence of such a
transfer, then an exchange between such individuals will occur.
2. The participants in the transaction have no legal, physical, or mental
obstacles preventing them from the determination of the terms of the
transaction such as the quantity of the commodity to be transferred,
the price of the commodity, the terms of payment, the time and place
for the transfer, etc.
3. The cause of the transfer is the willingness to satisfy needs as com-
pletely as possible.
4. Each of the participants in the transfer must possess either a definite
quantity of a commodity or a definite quantity of money, which has a
smaller value to the respective owner than what he will obtain.
5. All participants are willing to engage in the transfer voluntarily.
IV
Concluding Remarks
THE ABOVE ONTOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION of economic phenomena suggests the
following conclusion: On the one hand, an economic object is a subjective
entity since its mode of existence depends on it being perceived by agents
as ‘economic’. What ‘economic’ means is that the judgment involves an
evaluation directed at making a choice among known alternatives. Every
choice concerns some element of scarcity such as limited time, limited
productive resources, physical and intellectual limitations, levels of satia-
tion, and so on. Coping with scarcity is a fundamental feature of the human
condition which demands the allocation of means to meet ends.    Any ac-
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tivity of this nature is an economic activity and any thing evaluated in such
an activity acquires an economic character.
On the other hand, the judgment which the agent makes regarding the
economic object is subjective. But its truth or falsity can be settled objec-
tively by the correspondence of the judgment with facts about the object.
Some of these facts are intrinsic properties of the object. For example,
suppose that I see red apples which, in my judgment, appear luscious and
sweet. Further suppose that I desire to possess these apples in order to bake
an apple pie.  Owing to my judgment,  the  apples acquire certain putative
features which I see connected to the fulfillment of my present need to eat
a sweet and delicious apple pie. The actual fulfillment of my expectations,
however, will depend in part on the intrinsic properties of the apples. If
their red and luscious appearance does not correspond to their actual state
of ripeness, then my expectations will be proven false when I eat a piece of
sour apple pie if, for example, the apples were artificially ripened so they
look red and delicious but their chemical composition has not yet reached
the level of sweetness of ripe apples. But these are not the only facts to
consider in settling the truth or falsity of my expectations about the apples.
If, for example, the apples are in a basket on my neighbor’s yard but they
are not for sale, then these apples are not commodities. I could offer money
to my neighbor to try to persuade him to sell them to me but, if he does not
accept the offer, there will not be an exchange. Some of the facts, then, are
physical facts and other facts are social facts such as those involved in an
act of exchange. Any truth claims about my economic judgment are, then,
objectively determinable by means of all relevant facts.
The analysis we may advance, then, is this. There are two senses of
‘subjective’ in economic phenomena.13 On the one hand, there is an epi-
stemic sense of the term subjective that is embodied in economic judg-
ments. On the other hand, there is an ontological sense of the term sub-
jective according to which what is subjective are the things which are the
target of economic judgments. By means of economic judgments, putative
features are attached to things in connection with a want or need. These
features—e.g., scarcity, the thing’s significance in relation to a want or
need, the causal connection between the possession of the thing and the
fulfillment of an end—obtain, in the thing, a goods-character. But this is
not all.    These two senses of subjective are reconcilable with facts,  both
physical and social,  if  and  when  the  expectations  correspond  to  these
Ontology of Economic Objects                             311
facts. The theory of truth in this realist economic ontology is, then, one of
correspondence. In other words, what will instantiate truth in economic
judgments is the correspondence between expectations and their fulfillment
in facts.
Notes
1. Carl Menger’s contribution preceded the emergence of the neoclassical school of
economics which is the present mainstream in economics. His Principles of Economics
sewed as the foundation for the Austrian school of economics which, unlike the neoclassical
school, did not employ mathematics as its means of describing economic phenomena. Much
of neoclassical theory is, however, founded on Menger’s and other Austrian economists’
contributions to economic theory.
2. Friedrich A. von Hayek makes this point in “The Facts of the Social Sciences,”
Individualism and Economic Order, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and Lon-
don, .1948, p.59. Hayek writes, “Money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic,
if and because somebody thinks they are.” Ibid, p. 60. John Searle has argues similarly in, for
example, Minds, Brains and Science and The Construction of Social Reality that
money is what people think, use, and treat as money.
3. Neoclassical economists employ the term utility to denote preference for one good or
bundle of goods. A utility curve is a representation of the level of preference of a bundle of
goods. Suppose that the bundle of goods includes two goods, and one of these is X and the
other Y. The utility curve of such a bundle of goods is assigned a numerical value by a utility
function of the form U = U (X,Y).
4. See Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, p. 239
5. This last condition explains the spontaneous organization of market places, fairs, or
other means for advertising the availability of goods for sale. See Carl Menger, Principles of
Economics, p. 248—250. It is erroneous to think that needs for things are created by the
advertising of commodities since the concept of ‘need’ is a condition for the goods-character
of a thing. Accordingly, a commodity does not produce a need but merely addresses an
already existing need.
6. By contrast, Kant describes the satisfaction obtained from the beautiful as entirely
disinterested In other words, Kant’s conception of disinterestedness in the aesthetic judg-
ment of the beautiful is not merely the absence of desiring to possess the thing of beauty.
More importantly, Kant explains that the satisfaction derived form the beautiful finds no
grounds in the judging subject’s situation or private conditions. Rather, the satisfaction is
derived from the inherent characteristic in the thing itself which is universally intelligible as
beautiful. Whether or not one agrees with Kant, his explanation of disinterested judgment
presents a distinction between judgments which consider a personal gain—as is the case with
economic judgments—and those which are not bound up with concepts, feelings, or
deliberations unique to the judging subject given particularcircumstances—as Kant describes
the satisfaction obtained from the beautiful to be. See Immanuel Kant, Critique
ofJudgment, J.H. Bernard’s translation, 1968, pp.38—46.
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7. First-order goods are those which provide an immediate satisfaction of a need or want.
Higher-order goods, such as second-order or third-order goods, are those which stand in the
mediate stages toward the satisfaction of a need or want. As such, higher-order goods do not
provide a direct satisfaction in themselves, although their importance lies in the fact that they
are the intermediate needs toward the satisfaction of an end. The value attributed to yeast,
flour, butter, and eggs is, for example, dependent on the putative value of the bread which
these ingredients can be used to produce. If the agent perceives a connection between the
prospective value of the bread in connection with the satisfaction of his hunger, then the bread
as a good of a first order will determine the putative value of all the ingredients as goods of a
higher order.
8. Hence, the future value of a building is not equal to the capital invested in the factors of
production for the construction of the building. Rather, the future value of the building will
depend on the putative value of the satisfaction the agent will have to forego in the present if
his capital and entrepreneurial activity were not dedicated to the construction of the building.
The sacrificed present value of his resources will determine the expected future value of the
chosen alternative.
9. The main reason for this is that the body of economic theory does not address the
ontological status of ‘number’. Furthermore, to establish such an ontological commitment is
philosophically problematic since it does not explain how we establish the epistemic link with
abstract, mind-independent entities. In other words, since numbers are not part of our sensory
experience, how do we acquire knowledge of numbers? And further, how do numbers enter
the realm of human interaction such that, when I utter “two,” my interlocutor grasps my
meaning of “two”? -
10. The intentional directedness of mathematical beliefs is central to Husserl’s analysis of
mathematical objects. The considerations offered in the discussion rely on Husserl’s insights.
See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Section 2, Volume II, pp. 250—253. See also
Richard Tieszen, “Mathematics,” The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, pp. 438—
462.
11. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, p. 192, brackets mine.
12. Suppose that the price tag for a pair of shoes is $100. If the potential buyer estimates
that the pair of shoe.s has more value to him than other potential uses of the $100, then he will
buy the shoes. This does not mean that the price is equal to the subjective value of the shoes
to the buyer. The price of $100 that the buyer is willing to pay only reflects that the subjective
value of the shoes is at least $100. But it is possible that the buyer might have been willing
to pay $150 or more for the pair of shoes.
13. I am indebted to John Searle for his exposition of the epistemic and ontological sense
of subiective in The Construction of Social Reality, pp. 7—9.
